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In the year 756 ʿAbd al-Rahman ibn Muʿawiya entered the city of Córdoba and declared himself to be the new emir. It would take him thirty years of fighting to make it reality, but historians tend to mark this moment as the beginning of Umayyad rule in al-Andalus. This was in opposition to the ʿAbbasids who had overthrown the dynasty in the central Caliphate in 750. The caliphs of Baghdad may not have controlled Muslim Spain, but by 768 at the latest they had a reasonable grip on the province of Ifriqiya (roughly Tunisia, Libya and eastern Algeria).
In hindsight this all looks inevitable, but had you asked an intelligent observer in about 750 which family was most likely to dominate the Islamic west, the answer would probably have been neither the Umayyads nor the ʿAbbasids, but an alternative line, known to modern historians as the Fihrids. In Ifriqiya, ʿAbd al-Rahman ibn Habib (henceforth Ibn Habib) overthrew the centrally appointed governor in 744. Across the sea his close relative*, Yusuf al-Fihri took power in al-Andalus in 747. The stage looked set for the Fihrids to rule the Maghreb. Instead by 757 their power had been shattered.
This post is primarily intended as a post-mortem, examining what went wrong for the Fihrids and why. But I also think it gives us an opportunity to slightly rethink our periodisation of early Islamic history, as well as the patterns of power that would prevail in the Maghreb. The eighth century is still a time when most modern histories of the Islamic world are still focussed on the story of the Caliphate as a whole. A struggle between the Umayyads and the ʿAbbasids for the Maghreb works neatly as a natural coda to the revolution of 750. As local warlords using their support among elites to seize office and establish their own dynasty, the Fihrids don’t fit this. They feel historiographically premature. Their regimes have the flavour of a later period, when the textbooks start dividing their chapters geographically as well as chronologically. But this is precisely what makes them so interesting.
The Fihrids were members of the Quraysh, the Arab tribe that had dominated Mecca. Other members of the Quraysh included the Prophet Muhammad and the Umayyad family. Several branches of the Fihrid family had travelled west as part of the Arab conquest of the Maghreb. The most celebrated of these was ʿUqba ibn Nafiʿ, who founded Kairouan, the first capital of Ifriqiya, and who led the first Muslim army to reach the Atlantic in 683. His death in a Berber ambush on his way back only burnished his legend. Ibn Habib was ʿUqba’s great-grandson. Their prominent role in the conquest meant that the Fihrids acquired large estates, making them extremely wealthy. This combined with the prestige of their ancestry allowed the Fihrids to emerge as the natural spokesmen for Arab settlers in the Maghreb.

This was reinforced by the habit the Arabs of the west seem to have had of turning to the Fihrids in moments of crisis. Yusuf was appointed governor of Narbonne immediately after the Battle of Tours, where he seems to have done a good job stabilising the northern frontier. South of the Pyrenees, Charles Martel’s victory prompted the Arabs there to make a Fihrid from another branch, Ibn Qatan, governor. Although he was fired after two years for corruption, when the Berber revolt spread to al-Andalus in 741, Ibn Qatan was put back in charge.
The generations after ʿUqba were generally loyal to the Umayyad caliphate. Many of them took part in the conquest of Spain in 711 and, as in the case of Ibn Qatan, a number of governors of al-Andalus were members of the family. Ibn Habib’s father, the unsurprisingly named Habib, commanded the armies of Ifriqiya in Souss in 739 and in Sicily in 740. The turning point, as with so many things, was the Berber Revolt in 740. This not only shook Umayyad power in the west, it also undermined Damascus in the eyes of the Fihrids. Both Ibn Habib’s father and uncle died in defeats at the hands of the Berbers. Worst still, the elite Syrian army sent to crush the Berbers were perceived to be looking down on the longer established Arab settlers. Ibn Habib watched the Syrian second-in-command treat his father with disrespect in person.
The uprising of 740 was also an existential challenge to the position of Fihrids and their constituents, which was built on the assumption that as Arabs of prestigious lineage they were superior to Berbers, even if they were Muslim. There may have been an element of anxiety among the Arab settlers that the central government might be willing to accept some Berber demands. This would have encouraged the Fihrids, particularly in North Africa, to take their opportunities to seize power to secure their position.
Fihrid dominance ultimately didn’t last long, but we shouldn’t assume that brevity was preordained. After all, an independent dynasty taking over al-Andalus and Ifriqiya is exactly what happened in 756 and 800 with the Umayyads and Aghlabids respectively. I’ve talked before about the emergence of successful polities built around strongmen in the ninth-century Caliphate in the wake of the Anarchy in Samarra, such as the Tulunids in Egypt, the Saffarids in Khurasan and the Samanids in Transoxiana.
I’m not going to overstate the solidity of the Fihrid regimes, but I suspect they’re victims of bad luck as much as anything else. They were also interestingly distinct from each other and faced dissimilar challenges. Ibn Habib’s setup seems to have depended very strongly on the support of his family, particularly his brothers Ilyas in Tripoli and Amran in Tunis. Power was very much concentrated in the hands of Arab settlers. The biggest threat were revolutionary Berber forces operating in large numbers in the provincial hinterlands. These were not united and followed slightly different strains of Kharijite thought, but they represented a continuation of the earlier Berber revolt of 740. We also have hints of various Arab plots in Kairouan, many of them led by Umayyad refugees such as the future ʿAbd al-Rahman I. By 752 however Ibn Habib appeared reasonably secure. A big Kharijite push on Tripoli had been defeated, and the governor had even started ordering raids on Sicily with an eye to a full invasion.
Yusuf’s al-Andalus looked very different. The Berber revolt there had devolved into a particularly murderous free for all, exacerbated by another round of civil war from 744 which nearly brought down the entire province. Among the key ‘stakeholders’ were Berbers, the remains of the Syrian army sent to quell said Berbers, and the longer established Arab settlers. None of these were unified interest groups and the Arab settlers in particular seem to have collapsed into multiple factions. Unlike in Ifriqiya, a regime built on just one of these groups was a non-starter. Yusuf’s pedigree and long career in al-Andalus gave him sway with the Arabs. He was able to call upon at least some Berber support. But the key relationship that underpinned his power was his alliance with the Syrian general al-Sumayl, who could bring a critical mass of the recently arrived veterans with him. So important was al-Sumayl that he was suspected of being the power behind Yusuf’s throne.
(There’s an interesting hint that Yusuf might also have been popular with some Christians. The great Fihrid stronghold in al-Andalus was Toledo, a city whose Christian population remained unusually influential in local governance. Some Iberian Christian sources put him at the start of lists of Umayyad emirs as the first Arab king of al-Andalus).
Ultimately what brought both Ibn Habib and Yusuf down was internal dissension in the face of external pressure. In 755 Ibn Habib was stabbed to death by his brother Ilyas, allegedly for executing his Umayyad brother-in-law on suspicion of treason. Ilyas then proclaimed himself governor in the name of the ʿAbbasid caliph al-Mansur. What followed was a very busy year featuring many broken promises which apparently culminated in Ibn Habib’s son, inevitably named Habib, slaying Ilyas in single combat. We don’t necessarily have to believe all of the details here, but civil war among the Fihrids proved fatal. Multiple groups of Kharijite Berbers took this turmoil as an opportunity to strike. Habib died in battle in 757 trying to fend them off, effectively ending Fihrid power in the area. Kairouan experienced an exciting reign of terror as one group of Kharijites began executing people for being insufficiently pious until another, more lenient force pushed them out and established a Berber caliphate that was crushed by ʿAbbasid troops in 761.
Ibn Habib got a bit unfortunate in his fraternal relations. Yusuf was arguably even more snakebit. In 755/6 his attention was firmly fixed on Zaragoza in the northeast of al-Andalus, where al-Sumayl was besieged by forces endorsed by al-Mansur. Although he successfully rescued his general and crushed the rebels, Yusuf then managed to lose a lot of soldiers failing to conquer Pamplona. Even worse, ʿAbd al-Rahman was able to use these northern distractions to cross over from North Africa. He raised an army initially among disgruntled Arabs in the vicinity of modern Granada, and from Syrians based in Seville. With this force the Umayyad was able to beat Yusuf in a battle outside Córdoba in 756 and take the city.
Fihrid al-Andalus died hard. Yusuf raised another army and was defeated in the field in 757. Toledo held out until 764 under Yusuf’s cousin. In 777, a member of the Fihrids raised a revolt in the northeast, supported by al-Mansur, although he was quickly defeated. In the same year one of Yusuf’s sons was part of the embassy that travelled to Paderborn, inviting Charlemagne to invade Spain in his ill-fated Roncesvalles campaign. The last gasp came in 785, when two of Yusuf’s sons raised Toledo in revolt, only to be crushed.
It’s tempting to find structural reasons for Yusuf’s downfall. His failure to manage all the factions gave ʿAbd al-Rahman an opening to build an army. He perhaps paid too much attention to places like Zaragoza and Pamplona in the north when he should have been concentrating on the all-important Guadalquivir river valley. I’m not sure I buy that. It’s worth noting that ʿAbd al-Rahman would eventually have to turn on his original supporters in order to stabilise al-Andalus. It’s also not like Yusuf knew ʿAbd al-Rahman was coming. Even the Umayyads would fight for Zaragoza if they didn’t anticipate a threat to their core territory in the south.
One advantage that ʿAbd al-Rahman had that Yusuf didn’t was his ancestry. It wasn’t just that the magic Umayyad name was one of the few that could compete with the descendants of ʿUqba. ʿAbd al-Rahman’s mother was Berber, which may have given him more credibility with those in al-Andalus. I think at the end of the day though, ʿAbd al-Rahman won the battles and Yusuf didn’t. Had they gone the other way, the Falcon of the Quraysh would be an interesting but obscure footnote, while we might be talking about the celebrated Fihrids of al-Andalus.
Something that I think is striking is that both regimes had to at least think about the danger posed by Caliph al-Mansur. ʿAbbasid troops only arrived in Ifriqiya in 761 but Ilyas seems to have had the caliph’s support for his assassination. Yusuf was actively crushing an ʿAbbasid backed revolt when ʿAbd al-Rahman crossed. This is a way the Fihrids genuinely are unusual for being so early. No other caliph seems to have been much interested in al-Andalus and by 800 Harun al-Rashid was willing to give up on Ifriqiya as well. That said, I don’t think ʿAbbasid pressure really explains the collapse of either branch of the Fihrids. It’s also not like later dynasties such as the Tulunids and Saffarids didn’t sometimes have to worry about Baghdad.
A more important takeaway to me is that both Fihrid polities seem to anticipate future developments. Fihrid North Africa looks an awful lot like that of the Aghlabids, particularly in its anti-Berber hostility and acquisitive attitude towards Sicily. The Fatimids weren’t Kharijites, but ‘messianic leader commanding a Berber army that sweeps through the cities of Ifriqiya’ works as a description of both 757-8 and 902-909. Yusuf’s al-Andalus, built around a slightly rickety coalition of different interests, with near constant rebellions almost everywhere, may appear more unfamiliar, but I think that is in large part because we underestimate just how shaky the early Umayyad emirate was. ʿAbd al-Rahman and his successors had to fight continuously for their position until the middle of the tenth century.
The Fihrids are interesting as a reminder of the contingency of history. While both Ibn Habib and Yusuf had problems, there is a very plausible universe where their regimes survived their deaths. At the same time, at the risk of seeming unimaginative, I suspect that the big picture doesn’t actually look that different. Fihrid al-Andalus probably closely resembles its Umayyad counterpart. The only meaningful change I can think of is that being longer established in the Maghreb, the Fihrids might have been less inclined to look to Syria for their cultural cues, but at most that would have been a difference in degree than of kind.
With regards to North Africa, it’s not clear to me how Fihrid interest in Sicily a couple of generations before the Aghlabids started conquering the island in 829 would change the picture in the central Mediterranean. My hunch is probably not much. I also think it’s likely that eventually something like the Fatimids would eventually overwhelm them. The interesting difference would come if the silver boom that took place in the 770s also happened in our alternative timeline. If, rather than mostly heading towards Baghdad, that silver had gone to a Fihrid ruler in Kairouan that might slightly change the setup, although even then I’m not sure how much. This possibly indicates that there were only so many ways Arab dynasties in the early medieval Islamic west could construct polities. The interesting comparison would probably be with the independent Berber confederations to the west, such as the Barghawata, the Midrarids in Sijilmasa, and eventually the Idrisids.
Perhaps the best reason to remember the Fihrids is as a means of recognising how early the Muslim world became polycentric. The struggle between al-Mansur and ʿAbd al-Rahman helps obscure it, but from the end of the Berber Revolt at the very latest, Islamic history can no longer be told as a story about the Caliphate as a whole. Instead the very many pieces that emerged from this eighth century crisis need to be understood on their terms and in their own light.
* Exactly how closely related is a good question. Yusuf might have been Ibn Habib’s son. The nasab or chain of patronymics does work. I do get a little nervous about this because (1) this isn’t something our earliest sources spell out; (2) you’d expect more interaction between father and son than we see; (3) the Fihrids are not exactly imaginative with names; and (4) the chronology to make it work gets very tight and requires a lot of people to do things while very young or very old**. I’ve seen scholars suggest that they might be cousins instead which does alleviate some of these worries.
** Yusuf first appears in the sources as governor of Narbonne in the 730s. That means the latest he could have been born is about 710 (even that’s a bit young). His supposed grandfather was commanding armies and fighting on the battlefield in 741, so I’m reluctant to push his birth to much before 680. That’s not impossible but it does require a couple of generations of young fathers. I worry a little bit that while both Ibn Habib’s father and grandfather participated in the conquest of Spain in 711, there’s no record of him taking part in it, despite him apparently being old enough to father Yusuf.








