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I just saw the production of Copenhagen at the Hampstead Theatre in London. I haven’t seen it performed since I went to the initial run at the National in 1998, when I believe I reviewed it for Nature (but if so, I can’t find it now). The play is about the meeting between Danish physicist Niels Bohr and German physicist Werner Heisenberg in 1941 in Nazi-occupied Denmark, when Heisenberg was leading the German uranium project to try to harness nuclear fission, discovered by Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann in Berlin in 1938. (They did not understand their results, and sent a description of them to their former colleague Lise Meitner, who, as an Austrian Jew, had had to flee Germany after the Anschluss. Meitner was in Sweden, where, together with her nephew Otto Frisch, she figured out that the uranium atoms bombarded with neutrons were undergoing fission.)
Heisenberg regarded Bohr as a mentor. He worked with Bohr in Copenhagen on and off from 1924 to 1927, during which time they and their colleagues (especially Max Born and Pascual Jordan in Göttingen, as well as, independently, Erwin Schrödinger in Zurich) developed quantum mechanics. Bohr’s Institute for Theoretical Physics in Copenhagen was the centre of the universe for quantum mechanics in the 1920s and 30s, where all the bright young researchers went to learn and study under Bohr. But when Heisenberg went there in 1941, it was as a representative of the invading power and a cultural ambassador of the Nazis. He spoke with Bohr, apparently asking him for his opinion about working on the release of nuclear energy from fission. But the purpose of that conversation, and quite what was said, has been the subject of much controversy. Was Heisenberg seeking Bohr’s blessing for his uranium work for Hitler? Was he trying to find out what Bohr knew about the Allied work on fission? Was he trying to warn Bohr that the Germans were working on this? Or was he, as Bohr’s wife Margrethe suggests in the play, just wanting to show himself off to his former colleagues and mentor? In a three-way interaction between Bohr, Heisenberg and Margrethe looking back after they have all died, Copenhagen interrogates those questions, again and again, ultimately concluding that sometimes we do not even know our own reasons for what we do.
It’s a wonderfully smart play – often compared to Tom Stoppard’s Arcadia in its integration of scientific themes, though I have to say that Arcadia is the better play, with more emotional punch (and funnier). But it’s unfair to compare with Stoppard (and elsewhere, Frayn is extremely funny – I had to stop reading Towards the End of the Morning in public because I kept embarrassing myself with my snorting). Coming back to the play with much more knowledge about Bohr, Heisenberg and the surrounding history, I am deeply impressed at how informed Frayn was about the history and the science. I have no quibbles with the science at all. (I’m even happy to overlook the suggestion of Schrödinger’s Cat being alive and dead at once, as the scientists themselves might have said such things, as many scientists still do.) The handling of uncertainty, the staging on a round stage on which the performers circulate like orbiting electrons in the Bohr atom – all of it is extremely well managed. (The Hampstead in fact borrowed the rotating circular stage from the recent, and brilliant, production of Arcadia at the Old Vic.)
Bohr was played by Richard Schiff from The West Wing. Inevitably I have high expectations, and I have to say that this wasn’t the Bohr I feel I know. (My biography of Bohr, The Man Who Broke Reality, will be published in the autumn, but I have written books previously both about quantum mechanics (Beyond Weird) and about the response of the German physicists to life under the Third Reich, looking particularly at Heisenberg, Max Planck, and the Dutch physicist Peter Debye (Serving the Reich).) The American accent took a while to get used to – there’s no reason it shouldn’t be American, given that the actors wisely weren’t “doing accents” (the director Michael Longhurst said that would have been too ‘Allo ‘Allo), but I guess for a British audience this just seems more of a statement than Damien Molony (Heisenberg)’s Irish brogue. The bigger problem was that Schiff’s Bohr was just too prickly and irascible, lacking the evident warm and mild temperament that all who know Bohr testified to. This was not necessarily Schiff’s doing, as some of it was scripted. At one point Bohr berates Heisenberg for having the temerity to challenge him in a talk he gave in Göttingen when the two first met in 1922, whereas by all accounts Bohr didn’t mind in the slightest being challenged by a student (which would have been an affront to most German professors) and even sought Heisenberg out afterwards to chat some more. (At the same time, credit to Frayn for appreciating that Bohr’s presence in Göttingen at that time was in part a statement about bringing Germany back into the scientific fold when others were ostracizing it after the First World War.)
The big question is whether the play gives a fair picture of the views and motives of the characters about the Copenhagen meeting. Frayn wrote the play after reading the book Heisenberg’s War by journalist Thomas Powers, which argued that Heisenberg purposely dragged his feet in the German uranium project so as not to deliver an atom bomb to Hitler. Powers even implied that Heisenberg might have falsified his calculations to sabotage the project – an idea no historian buys, and which I discuss in Serving the Reich. Historians who have studied this period – one of the most authoritative is Mark Walker of Union College – don’t accept the account that Powers gave, and there is no good evidence that Heisenberg took any deliberate steps to ensure that the Germans did not make an atom bomb. Why the German project achieved so little – they were just beginning to get close to having a crude (and possibly unsafe) reactor working by the time the war ended – has been much debated, and Frayn does a good job of capturing some of this debate. Did Heisenberg estimate the critical mass needed to make a bomb? If so, did he do the calculation right? If not, why not?
But in any event, Copenhagen, having been so influenced by Powers’ book, was initially inflected far too much in Heisenberg’s favour. After the play was first performed, it stimulated so much discussion of the issues that the Bohr family decided to release previously undisclosed letters that Bohr wrote to Heisenberg in 1957 presenting his version of the events in Copenhagen. Bohr wrote these letters after seeing Heisenberg’s version – more properly, the version attributed to Heisenberg – in the book Brighter Than a Thousand Sons by the Austrian writer Robert Jungk, an account of the making of the atom bomb. That version was exculpatory, as was the account that Heisenberg generally offered after the war for what he was doing in the uranium project. He made out that the German scientists had after all been very smart in getting the Third Reich to fund their research on nuclear fission for a reactor while deftly avoiding the moral dilemma of whether to make a bomb. Bohr was uncharacteristically angry about what Heisenberg said to Jungk regarding the Copenhagen meeting. In typical Bohr style, he drafted and redrafted his letter many times – but in the end never sent it.
In the light of these letter drafts, Frayn revised his play to make it rather more even-handed. As I recall, the initial version had Heisenberg voice the position he and his protégé Carl von Weizsäcker began to concoct as soon as they, held captive by the British in Cambridgeshire, heard about the Hiroshima bombing: that they, working under an authoritarian regime, had chosen not to make this awful weapon, whereas the free scientists under the Allies had done so and used it on civilians. At any rate, there’s no such line in the current version of the play. All the same, there remains too much implication that Bohr was culpable for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atrocities because he went to Los Alamos. In fact, by the time he got there after escaping from Denmark in 1943 just before the Germans began rounding up those of Jewish heritage (Bohr’s mother was Jewish), the work was more or less done. Bohr made token contributions, really quite unnecessarily, to a few technical aspects, but he was mostly regarded by the scientists at Los Alamos as a kind of moral compass, bringing hope (as Oppenheimer put it) to a project that seemed to many of them to be grim.
Besides, Bohr was deeply alarmed at the implications of the atom bomb, and he began at once to try persuading the Allied leaders Roosevelt (and later Truman) and Churchill to start open talks with Stalin to avoid a postwar arms race. In this he was unsuccessful, but he devoted much of his postwar life to the attempt. Many see him as the first scientist to acknowledge the full moral and pollical seriousness of nuclear arms. It’s a shame that there is no mention of this at all in Copenhagen.
Heisenberg does now come in for a fair bit of criticism in the play, especially from Margrethe, played by Alex Kingston. (One of the great virtues of Frayn’s play is the central role it gives to Margrethe – a good reflection of the role she played in Bohr’s life, although Frayn’s Margrethe is more fierce and outspoken than she was in real life. Nonetheless, she was indeed outspokenly critical of and dismayed by Heisenberg’s conduct in Copenhagen in 1941.) But he is still somewhat let off the hook. Much is made, for example, of the fact that Heisenberg did not mention explicitly to Albert Speer in 1942 that a bomb could be created from plutonium produced in a uranium-fuelled reactor. But Heisenberg did allude to that possibility in a 1941 document he wrote for the German Army Ordnance, where he said that “once in operation, the machine [uranium reactor] can also lead to the production of an incredibly powerful explosive.”
And contrary to the idea that the Germans downplayed the possibility of a bomb, Heisenberg’s own accounts contradict this. He later wrote that “one can say that the first time large funds were made available in Germany was in the spring of 1942 after the meeting with [Bernhard] Rust [of the Reich Education Ministry] when we convinced him that we had absolutely definitive proof that it could be done” – “it” here clearly meaning a bomb in this context. There is an account from the spring of 1943 of a lecture by Heisenberg to Reich officials saying that the scientists felt they could, within just one or two years, deliver a bomb with “hitherto unknown explosive and destructive power.”
Well, there’s much more to be said, and I say some of it in Serving the Reich and The Man Who Broke Reality. But as I say in the latter, we should not read Copenhagen as history, or expect Frayn to have written it as such. It remains one of the most inventive, intelligent and creative plays about science and scientists, and I’d recommend anyone who can to go and see it. (Perhaps not at the Hampstead, which I think is now sold out…)