We are actively investigating this security incident and sharing our findings here: www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-a-self-spreading-supply-chain-attack-hits-the-npm-ecosystem
Google has patched an Android ADB bug in the May security patch set. If you have a Pixel phone you should already have the patches, and most other major manufacturers should be close behind. Unfort…
The Mini Shai-Hulud worm is actively compromising legitimate npm packages by hijacking CI/CD pipelines and stealing developer secrets. StepSecurity's OSS Package Security Feed first detected the attack in official @tanstack packages and is tracking its spread across the ecosystem in real time.
On 2026-05-11, an attacker chained a pull_request_target Pwn Request, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and OIDC token extraction from runner memory to publish 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages on npm. Full postmortem.
On May 11, 2026, the Mini Shai-Hulud worm compromised 84 npm package artifacts across 42 @tanstack/* packages (as well as @squawk/*, @mistralai/* packages, and others) by chaining a GitHub Actions "Pwn Request," cache poisoning, and OIDC token extraction from runner memory — producing the first npm supply chain attack with valid SLSA Build Level 3 attestations. Here's what happened, what was stolen, and what you need to do right now.
TeamPCP’s Mini Shai-Hulud campaign used hijacked GitHub OIDC tokens to spread a credential-stealing worm through TanStack npm packages.
TeamPCP’s Mini Shai-Hulud campaign used hijacked GitHub OIDC tokens to spread a credential-stealing worm through TanStack npm packages.
The Mini Shai-Hulud worm is actively compromising legitimate npm packages by hijacking CI/CD pipelines and stealing developer secrets. StepSecurity's OSS Package Security Feed first detected the attack in official @tanstack packages and is tracking its spread across the ecosystem in real time.
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On 2026-05-11, an attacker chained a pull_request_target Pwn Request, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and OIDC token extraction from runner memory to publish 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages on npm. Full postmortem.