A supply chain attack on GitHub Action tj-actions/changed-files caused many repositories to leak their secrets.
A single threat actor - TeamPCP - compromised a chain of widely-used open source tools: Trivy, KICS, LiteLLM, and Telnyx. This post looks at the campaign and explores the question: once you've pinned your actions and hardened your runners, what actually detects credential exfiltration from a compromised CI/CD pipeline?
An external attacker could submit a pull request to any repository using Claude Code Action, wait for a reviewer to trigger the action, and then replace the PR title with a prompt injection payload…
Our research team recently discovered an exploitable pattern in GitHub Actions that lets attackers exploit seemingly fixed vulnerabilities.
Sandbox your tools before they harm you
Anne Robinson would like a word with .github/workflows
Today we're excited to announce OSS Rebuild, a new project to strengthen trust in open source package ecosystems by reproducing upstream artifacts. As supply chain attac…