GeistHaus
log in · sign up

Countering "Trusting Trust" - Schneier on Security

schneier.com

Way back in 1974, Paul Karger and Roger Schell discovered a devastating attack against computer systems. Ken Thompson described it in his classic 1984 speech, “Reflections on Trusting Trust.” Basically, an attacker changes a compiler binary to produce malicious versions of some programs, INCLUDING ITSELF. Once this is done, the attack perpetuates, essentially undetectably. Thompson demonstrated the attack in a devastating way: he subverted a compiler of an experimental victim, allowing Thompson to log in as root without using a password. The victim never noticed the attack, even when they disassembled the binaries—the compiler rigged the disassembler, too...

5 pages link to this URL
Fully Countering Trusting Trust through Diverse Double-Compiling (DDC)

David A. Wheeler's Page on Countering 'Trusting Trust' through Diverse Double-Compiling (DDC) - Countering Trojan Horse attacks on Compilers

14 inbound links en Trusting trusttrojan horsecompilercompilerscompilationsubversionmaliciousmalicious compilersubverted compilerThompsonKen ThompsonACSACACSAC 2005diverse double-compilingdiverse double compilingDDCReflections on Trusting Trustreproducible buildsreproduceable buildsdeterministic buildsSpencerKargerSchellDraperMcDermottUnixC compilertccgccDavidWheelerDavid A. Wheelermicro-taintmicrotaintmicro-taintingmicrotaintingPerlregular expressions