Security Update: Suspected Supply Chain Incident | liteLLM

Big Muddy is Jean-Paul R. Soucy's blog about technology, science, politics, and other curiosities.

The Mercor breach and the LiteLLM compromise exposed a blind spot in AI security. This deep technical piece explains how to secure AI data vendors, CI/CD paths, release pipelines, and AI gateways with continuous red teaming and evidence-backed validation.

Python Package Index shares insights and provides guidance following LiteLLM/Telnyx supply-chain attacks

Joe Desimone shares the story of how he caught the Axios supply chain attack with a proof of concept tool built in an afternoon.

Big Muddy is Jean-Paul R. Soucy's blog about technology, science, politics, and other curiosities.

Big Muddy is Jean-Paul R. Soucy's blog about technology, science, politics, and other curiosities.

TeamPCP compromises LiteLLM, distributing malicious PyPI versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8, using .pth files for stealthy persistence and data exfiltration.

Trivy ecosystem supply chain was briefly compromised

In March there was a particularly nasty supply chain attack targeting Aqua Security and their tools, including the widely used Trivy security scanner, which later spread to other projects. The attack was carried out by a threat actor named TeamPCP and began by exploiting an insecure GitHub Actions workflow that utilised the pull_request_target trigger – a type known to be dangerous and easily misused. Using this, they stole a Personal Access Token granting wider access to the aquasecurity org.

Es hat offenbar ein Angriff auf die Open-Source-Bibliothek zur Anbindung an LLMs stattgefunden, wodurch zwei kompromittierte Pakete Credentials stehlen können.

Is security spending more tokens than your attacker?

Python’s default package management system pip now has an official mechanism for supporting dependency cooldowns, which we previously discussed on this blog as …

AI everywhere, agents everywhere. We just finished the first quarter of 2026, and a lot happened in those first 3 months. It feels like 3 y...

A Python project got hacked where malicious releases were directly uploaded to PyPI. I said on Mastodon that had the project used trusted publishing with digital attestations, then people using a pylock.toml file would have noticed something odd was going on thanks to the lock file including attestation data.

Insights and guidance from our engineering team on how Astral secures its tools.