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Piece for KettleMag on Monday about the Priti Patel // Israel fiasco:

Priti Patel, the International Development Secretary, has been accused of running her own “freelance foreign policy” on Israel, following a BBC report that revealed the Conservative minister held several undisclosed meetings whilst on holiday in August.

The Conservative MP for Witham has since apologised, under pressure from Labour figures claiming Patel’s “complete disregard” for the ethics of public service may constitute a breach of lobbying rules, along with the ministerial code. Protocol dictates that ministers must inform the Foreign Office when conducting official business overseas; in the words of a former diplomat, the local consulate must be contacted if the trip is anything more than for “building sandcastles on the beach.”

Patel attended meetings with representatives of several Israeli firms and charities, such as the director of Israeli disability charity BIS, but it is her encounters with major Israeli political  figures that has proved controversial, since no diplomats were present. Accompanied by Lord Polak, a Conservative peer, she met Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, security minister Gilad Erdan, and Yair Lapid, the leader of Israel’s centrist Yesh Atid Party.

The involvement of Lord Polak, chairman of the Conservative Friends of Israel, has muddied the waters, since he has been an influential figure on UK government policy in the Middle East for some time. Patel is known to be a strong supporter of Israel, but her significant involvement with an organisation once described as “the most well-connected and probably the best funded of all Westminster lobbying groups” invites questions as to how much of an impact the pro-Israel lobby has on her work.

Patel has headed up the Department for International Development (DfID) since the general election in June, and has already tightened up the guidelines on how the £68m of aid the UK provides the Palestinian territories is spent. She has presented the prime minister and foreign secretary with a proposal to impose further restrictions on the aid, but this was pushed back.

The debacles comes at a time when the UK’s relationship with Israel is receiving considerable attention, with November marking 100 years since the Balfour Declaration sparked events which led to the creation of the state of Israel. The centenary has proven divisive in British politics of late, with Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn snubbing a dinner to mark the occasion, whilst the shadow foreign secretary, Emily Thornberry, has called for formal UK recognition of the state of Palestine as a fitting response.

Despite the embarrassment for Patel, viewed as a potential candidate for Conservative leader in the future, there is unlikely to be much response from Theresa May. The Prime Minister has “reminded her of the obligations which exist under the ministerial code,” but this is as far as the rebuke is likely to go, as May must not want to lose another cabinet minister so soon after the resignation of Sir Michael Fallon.

Whether the matter gets referred to an investigation remains to be seen, but at the very least the affair raises questions on how vulnerable UK policy on the Middle East is to the lobbying of pressure groups such as the Conservative Friends of Israel.

As published in the first October 2017 edition of Exepose, the University of Exeter student newspaper. Featured in the print edition. 

More than a year has passed since the divisive vote for Britain to leave the European Union, and the country remains as polarised as ever. Early ‘Remainer’ appetite for a second referendum, based on an unravelling of the false narrative provided by Boris and co., has faded, and indeed public opinion on the necessity of British withdrawal from the EU has not shifted sufficiently enough to warrant a re-run of last July’s vote. And so the Brexit juggernaut marches on. Divorce from Brussels will impact the country in ways we are still finding out, but the most visible and concerning effects will be on the UK’s economy, epitomised by what some have called a banking exodus from London. Before now, there had been too few announcements to characterise it as such, but a new report by think-tank Bruegel predicts a whopping 1.8 trillion euros worth of assets are to be removed from the UK by financial clients. But what does this mean for the industry, and is it limited to the financial sector?

Full British withdrawal from the EU could still be years away, meaning businesses and financial organisations have so far seen few tangible signs of what future trading conditions will be like. Big institutions, however, plan far in advance, and some London-based banks have already announced plans to move key jobs elsewhere, with Frankfurt a favoured destination. Dublin also stands to benefit, with JP Morgan looking to double staff numbers in the Irish capital. Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, Citigroup, Standard Chartered, and Nomura Holdings are all in the process of establishing EU headquarters elsewhere to ensure continued access to the single market. Goldman Sachs is considering a similar move, and on Thursday completed a deal to lease a new Frankfurt office block which holds enough space to increase its number of staff in the German city from 200, to 1,000 people. The Wall Street bank employs 6,000 people across the UK, and is the latest to secure a means to expanding operations outside London. This sets a worrying trend for an industry that accounts for 12% of the UK’s tax income.

Yet, take a look at the numbers, and events so far do not paint a picture of the doomsday scenario as some commentators have predicted. Job-relocation numbers of course vary from bank to bank, with some relatively low, and others fairly high as a percentage of their UK workforce. For example Citigroup Inc. only plans on relocating 250 jobs from their 9,000 strong UK workforce, whereas Deutsche Bank may be moving 4,000 positions from the UK to Frankfurt. This is certainly concern enough that the flow needs to be stopped, and Theresa May’s government has come under fire for prioritising anti-EU ideology rather than adequately addressing the problem with real solutions. Andrew Parmley, the Lord Mayor of London’s financial district, warned on Wednesday that the economy could be facing a “cliff edge” without the implementation of a cohesive Brexit transition deal, such is the importance of the financial sector. Mr Parmley did however, praise the two-year transition deal outlined in the PM’s Florence speech as a “bridge to the future” but stressed the importance of an agreement being hammered out before the end of the year.

The transition deal referred to by Mr Parmley is an attempt by Theresa May to secure a smoother, more gradual regulatory exit from EU jurisdiction for businesses, and was well received after a stalling in talks. It remains to be seen whether the EU accepts the deal, and business leaders across all sectors remain understandably concerned at the prospect of a turbulent future.

As a result, many firms have been considering their options. Few big-name companies have declared plans to leave the UK, but investment for the future has stalled amidst the uncertainty. To increase confidence in the UK’s capacity to remain an economic powerhouse, the government has worked to secure important investment commitments from big employers, such as the Japanese car manufacturers Nissan, Honda and Toyota, which account for around half of British car output. Nonetheless, they, and other large firms, have been busily creating contingency plans should a ‘hard Brexit’ result in tougher trading conditions.

These contingency plans have been to maintain a presence in the European single market in some way. The Irish Times reported in February that 100,000 UK firms have registered companies in Ireland since the vote to leave the EU, including one of Northern Ireland’s largest manufacturers, Almac Group. Whilst this does not mean closure of their UK operations; 100,000 firms are unlikely to up-and-move across the Irish Sea, there is a definite sense that many are hedging their bets in the face of uncertain times to come. The Republic of Ireland offers continuing access to the single market, which the UK is likely to withdraw from, creating the possibility of UK goods and services being less competitive due to EU tariffs increasing their cost.

In the short term, the banking exodus is most concerning for ministers, but much is still to be revealed, and London has recovered from shocks to the banking system before. In the run up to the EU referendum, a PwC report estimated that between 70,000 and 100,000 financial services jobs could be lost, and such estimations have now been widely discredited. Barclay’s have concluded the situation is a “wholly manageable challenge” and the latest reports suggest around 10,000 jobs will be relocated in total. The government must be wary of complacency on the issue, but London remains an attractive host for banks. Decades worth of banking infrastructure exists, and levels of regulation remain more favourable than in other countries. The head of the British Banking Association has also noted the reluctance of staff themselves to relocate, “they’ve got homes here, kids in school and so forth.” It may be the case that the banking industry decentralises somewhat, with other European banking centres growing in size, but not to the point that London, and the UK financial scene as a whole, becomes irrelevant.

When the British public went to the voting booths in July 2016, many will tell you without hesitation they had no clear idea of what they were voting for, such was the uncertainty at the time. The only clear-cut fact, was that Britain had become so intertwined with the EU that divorce would inevitably have great consequence; for British and European citizens, for businesses, and for the financial markets. This is still the case, and what the future holds for the UK’s financial industry, and its production industries, remains unclear as the country navigates unchartered waters.

Very brief article for KettleMag outlining Islamic State defeat in Hawija. Read here:

On the 5th October, Islamic State was driven out of their last major position in Iraq, the town of Hawija, after only two weeks of fighting.

Lieutenant-General Abdul Ameer Rasheed Yarallah, joint operations commander for the offensive, declared the area liberated from Islamic State rule, with 196 militants killed in the fighting.

Reports suggest that as many as 1,000 Islamic State militants surrendered in the final few days of fighting for Hawija, unusual for a group with a carefully crafted reputation for fearlessness in battle. This is a growing trend, and US commanders on the ground have suggested the group’s rank-and-file are demoralised, often abandoned by their leaders, as the terrorist group looks increasingly unable to defend its territory.

NEW: U.S.-backed Iraqi forces have liberated Hawija, the last ISIS stronghold in northern Iraq
https://t.co/mbqYhQaeww pic.twitter.com/LJ1i5wl8pt

— NBC News (@NBCNews) October 5, 2017

It further marks a dramatic reversal in fortunes for the group, which at its’ peak controlled an area the size of Great Britain. Islamic State’s territorial power in Iraq has been waning for some time, having lost control of its de-facto capital Mosul in July when the northern city was recaptured by Iraqi forces following nine-months of fighting.

In Paris last Thursday, the Iraqi prime minister declared the liberation of Hawija a “victory not just for Iraq but for the whole world” and stated his intention to pursue the group to their remaining positions in desert towns such as al-Qaim, on the border with Syria.

With Islamic State demise in Iraq, the focus is increasingly turning to the fight against Islamic State in Syria. The group is battling to maintain control over the city of Raqqa, which it overran in 2013. It’s de-facto Syrian capital is besieged from all sides by a collection of U.S. backed forces, mainly the SDF and other Kurdish militias, with the Euphrates river blocking escape to the south. As these forces close in, Islamic State fighters are becoming trapped in the centre of the city, and it is only a matter of time before they are killed or forced to surrender.

As a result of these territorial losses, the pretence of statehood is now over. But analysts are concerned about fighters and sympathises that have melted away in the background; those capable of waging a violent insurgency in Iraq, like al-Qaeda before them, or who will simply join like-minded groups in Syria. Islamic State will continue to lose physical territory, but military defeats will not spell the end of the group’s poisonous ideology.

First published on kettlemag.com following the recent independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan. Read here:

“Do you want the Kurdistan Region and Kurdish areas outside of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to become an independent state?”

On Wednesday evening, the result of the controversial referendum on full independence for Iraqi Kurdistan was announced: “yes”.

A total of 92.73% of votes were in support of Kurdish independence from Iraq.

In Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan’s capital, this will mostly be welcome news, and comes as no surprise. Reports indicate a high turn out; with 72% of registered voters taking part, and whilst the region is not politically unified, there is little faith in the federal government based in Baghdad.

As the largest ethnic group without a state in the world, some form of Kurdish independence has been aspired to in this region for decades. The Iraqi Kurdistan region achieved a level of autonomy in 2005, but its’ reach is limited and still answers to Baghdad. A referendum on complete independence was announced back in July 2014, to capitalise on worldwide pro-Kurd sentiment following impressive military victories against the Islamic State group, but there had been hopes of delaying the decisive vote in favour of UN brokered talks with Baghdad.

So what next?

All eyes will be on Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Regional Government and architect of the referendum. He has made clear there will be no immediate declaration of independence following the result, and will instead initiate talks with the Iraqi government in Baghdad.

Such negotiations would require openness from both sides, however, and Haider al-Abadi, Iraq’s prime minister, has assured his parliament he has no intention of holding talks with the Kurdish authorities, and demanded that the outcome be cancelled.

Abadi has repeatedly called the referendum “unconstitutional”, threatening to intervene militarily should the process cause any violence. He has demanded that the region surrender control of its international airports.

How did we get here?

 Kurdish ambitions of independence have been harboured for decades, since the breakup of the Ottoman Empire following WWI. Kurds primarily inhabit areas of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Armenia, but with Iraqi Kurdistan being self-governing, it is here that many thought a sovereign state most possible. This current referendum has provided hope that this will finally become a reality, although a “yes” vote does not signal immediate withdrawal from the Iraqi state. A similar, non-binding poll was held in 2005, and Barzani has indicated that the result is to be used for leverage in talks with the Baghdad government over what the future holds for the territory. The difference this time, as opposed with 2005, is the balance of power has shifted. Media coverage of the Kurdish Peshmerga taking a stand against the Islamic State proved popular in the West, especially the idea of a unit made up entirely of women. Since then, there appeared to be much more sympathy and support for the question of Kurdish sovereignty.

International opposition to the referendum

The referendum not only threatens to redraw the borders in Iraq, but also holds unwanted implications for the neighbouring states of Turkey and Iran; home to sizeable Kurdish minorities. Turkey has strongly opposed the referendum, threatening to close its border and block vital oil exports out of Kurdish territory, and even conducted joint military manoeuvres with the Iraqi army near the border at Habur. Despite a close working relationship with Erbil and Barzani’s KDP, Turkey is concerned that independence for Iraqi Kurdistan will increase calls for autonomy amongst its own sizeable Kurdish population, estimated to number about 14 million people.

As for the US, there remains a tough decision on who to support. Since Nato military operations commenced in 1991 to protect the Kurds from Saddam Hussein’s brutality, they have emerged as an erstwhile ally for Washington, and the Kurdish Peshmerga has at times proven far more effective in fighting Islamic State than the conventional Iraqi army. But the US ultimately wants a united Iraq and had hoped to at least delay the referendum, with efforts to drive out the final remnants of Islamic State in Iraq ongoing. Highlighting this conflict of interest, a US State Department press statement describes a position of being “deeply disappointed” in the referendum being conducted, whilst stressing their “historic relationship” will not be effected.

Territorial Gains

What has infuriated Baghdad the most, is that the area specified in the referendum includes Iraqi territory which has been seized by the Peshmerga from Islamic State. Areas such as the oil-rich city of Kirkuk previously lay outside of the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan, leading Abadi to assert that recent events have simply been an exercise by the Kurds to control more of Iraq’s oil reserves.

The disputed territory will be a prized bargaining chip for Barzani heading into negotiations, when, and if, they materialise. For Abadi, the act of agreeing to talks would be giving the referendum a legitimacy that would immediately undermine his own position.

Therefore, as things stand, there is no political incentive for either side to back down. Such a stalemate will need mediating. The US is a natural candidate simply because of how invested it is in Iraq’s future, but Turkey, and to a lesser extent, Iran, will also be primed to influence proceedings.

In the short term, Abadi will not allow the North to secede without a fight, but the two sides are unlikely to engage militarily. For all his rhetoric, the Iraqi prime minister is aware that international actors will not allow another civil war in the Middle East, and there must be doubts over the readiness of an army exhausted by the fight against Islamic State.

Despite the vote, the Kurds’ decades long struggle for a homeland is not there yet.

Commissioned by kettlemag.co.uk to briefly write about the role played by fixers in journalism worldwide. Here’s the piece:

For every established foreign correspondent or roving freelancer, there is a knowledgeable and resourceful team of fixers. Local jack-of-all-trades with the regional knowledge and connections to ensure the journalist has access to the areas and people they need to get the angle that they would otherwise miss.

Countries like Iraq have become accustomed to accommodating legions of foreign journalists over the years, covering what at times can seem like never-ending conflicts in a fragile region. It is in such a situation that a fixer becomes invaluable, as they provide reliable instruction on where is safe to visit, and where is not. Often, a local fixer doubles as a driver to facilitate safe travel through a turbulent region.

But do they get enough credit? 

Many a journalist has taken the time to acknowledge the role of the fixer in their work, yet it is rare for an article to bear reference to an individual fixer by name. There have been calls for their names to be cited in some way, much like how a book or research paper includes a list of acknowledgments, especially given the dangers faced by fixers in war zones. Of course, it would be impossible to acknowledge every individual involved in the process of getting an article to print, but if a fixer had been influential in arranging or sourcing a particular story, a mention of this fact would seem only fair.

The lack of recognition seems to be a bug bear, but not a complete deterrence. For many fixers, the motive is purely financial; armed conflict has a habit of decimating the economy of a state, and so becoming a fixer can provide a rare, reliable income. Helping to cover the battle against the Islamic State in Iraq can net a local fixer between $100 and $500 a day, sometimes more.

In modern times, the 24/7 news cycle has provided access to breaking news as it happens, revolutionising war reporting. Alongside the more conventional forms of media, the rise of social media means a story from the frontline can now make its way to the target audience instantaneously, via a quick tweet or online post.

So when scrolling twitter, or skimming through an article, spare a thought for those making it happen.

As first seen in Kettle Mag:

Following talks in Cairo on Wednesday, an embargo of the tiny Middle East peninsular of Qatar will continue, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister has announced, and further steps may follow.

As the deadline for Qatar to accept a severe 13-point list of demands expired, the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain and the UAE spoke of regret at Qatar’s “negative” response to their wishes. They accuse Qatar of fostering terrorism in the region, and of meddling in the internal politics of sovereign states.

The quartet of allies, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, cut diplomatic ties with Qatar last month, and imposed steep restrictions on a nation dependent on imports to meet the needs of its nearly 3 million inhabitants. Saudi airspace has been closed to all Qatar Airways flights, but it is the closure of the land border between Qatar and Saudi Arabia that has hit the hardest, leading to perhaps the most absurd story to emerge so far; as one Qatari businessman presses ahead with plans to airlift 4,000 cows to the country to maintain milk supplies.

Qatar has refused to back down. On Tuesday it’s foreign minister called the blockade “unprovoked, unjustified and unwarranted”, and accused the four countries involved of an attempt to force the state into surrendering its sovereignty. Plans are being drafted to allow Qatar to survive under such an embargo indefinitely, with valuable gas production being increased, and shipping being routed through Oman to circumnavigate the blockade.

Qatari ministers made it clear that the demands of the Saudi-led bloc will not be met. The 13-point document delivered to Qatar via Kuwaiti mediators presented demands to curb diplomatic relations with Iran, close a Turkish military base situated in Qatar, cut ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and, even more controversially, to close down the pan-Arab al Jazeera news network; credited with raising political awareness across the Middle East.

How did this happen?

At a glance, it would appear that Saudi Arabia, the main belligerent in this crisis, and Qatar, have much in common. Both are ruled by dynastic monarchies, the House of Saud, and the House of Thani, and the state religion of both countries is Sunni Islam. Many Qataris follow the conservative, Wahhabi, branch of Islam, which originates from Saudi Arabia.

Yet political strains have existed between the two neighbours since 1995, when the former Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani took power. Despite Sheikh Hamad abdicating in 2013, leaving the job to his son and current Emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, there have been suggestions that the ‘father-emir’ still pulls the strings from behind the scenes. Saudi Arabia wants regime change. Sheikh Hamad has in the past successfully maintained an independent political direction for the tiny peninsular, paying little regard to the foreign policy demands of it’s hegemonic neighbour. The House of Saud is known to have sponsored a series of failed attempts to depose the former Emir since his assumption of power; since a change in Qatari leadership would likely lead to Saudi Arabia exercising more control over the political course taken by Qatar, understandably the end-goal of this stand-off.

What role has the US played?

As with most major international crises, the United States has a stake in the matter, and the impasse playing out in the Gulf is no different. Donald Trump has blundered into a decades old disagreement, and it was his response to Saudi allegations of Qatari-funded terror that persuaded the House of Saud that action against Qatar could go ahead without US interference. Yet the United States will be eager for a peaceful solution to be found, with 11,000 US troops stationed at Al Udeid Air Base, its largest concentration of military personnel in the Middle East. So whilst Trump posts cryptic tweets about “interesting things” happening in the Middle East, the US state department has been attempting to follow a more nuanced course of action, working alongside Kuwait in an attempt to mediate what is already becoming a protracted deadlock.

The Future

The claims made by Saudi Arabia and its allies may not be entirely baseless. Ideologically committed to promoting Islamist causes, Qatar plays host to Kaheld Meshaal, the former leader of Hamas; the Palestinian Islamist group designated by the United States as a terrorist organisation. The Taliban briefly operated an office in Doha in 2003, where many senior Taliban leaders reside, and Qatari financing for Islamist groups across Syria and Libya has been under scrutiny ever since a link emerged with the murder of the American ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens, in 2012.

But why now? Saudi Arabia released a statement late on Thursday saying that Qatari refusal of their demands confirms their sabotage of security in the Middle East, and amounts to proof of Qatar’s links to terror groups. Whilst Qatar’s foreign policy has at times bordered on the murky side, Saudi Arabia too has faced questions over the financing of militant groups across the Middle East, and continues to fight a controversial war in Yemen. The four countries involved in the boycott are doing so for their own interests, and it has been pointed out that the Qatari-run Al Jazeera news network has often been critical of the four states.

The future trajectory of the conflict is difficult to predict, but neither side seems likely to back down soon. Qatar is posturing for a protracted conflict, making plans to survive despite the deadlock, and has the wealth to do so. Much will hinge on the severity of the permanent sanctions the four Arab states are preparing. For now, the prospect of a solution looks remote.

First published on Kettle Mag  ——

For most people planning their next holiday or trip away, the Middle East may not quite enter onto their radar. Sadly, this is a region that rarely escapes the news, often for the wrong reasons, and it is true that the British Foreign Office would rather we avoided certain countries; a quick check of their travel advice is essential before planning a trip.

For those willing to look beyond the negative headlines, a treasure trove of travel opportunities await. After all, the opulence and warmth of Dubai welcomes millions of visitors from around the globe, and it is easy to forget that this modern metropolis lies within the geographical bounds of the Middle East.

Those searching for a destination with a little more history need look no further than Jordan, home of the ancient city of Petra, which overcame fierce competition to take its place as one of the New Seven Wonders of the World. Oman too boasts a rich heritage, and as yet has not seen the spike in visitors that it deserves, meaning it’s pristine coastline and spectacular deserts are still free to explore virtually undisturbed.

For students, the only downside to this trio of bucket-list worthy destinations is the cost; cheap flights are a rarity (a return flight to Oman will set you back around £400), and hostel-culture is yet to take off across much of the Middle East.

If finances are tight, then an economical, and exciting option, would be to start a Middle East adventure with Lebanon, a small but fascinating nation situated between Syria and Israel on the Mediterranean coast. A one-way plane ticket from London to Beirut, capital of the Lebanese Republic, can be as little as £120. Once there, there is no shortage of hotels, along with more budget accommodation options, some hostels charging between £12-£25 a night.

Modern day Lebanon is a fusion of East and West, a melting pot of nationalities and religions. As the sun sets over Beirut, church bells ring side-by-side with the call to prayer from the Mohammad Al-Amin Mosque, a perfect summation of the unique blend of Christian and Muslim communities found in this country of just under 6million people.

Beirut provides excitement wherever you go, and no-two people approach the capital in the same way. Some prefer to visit the museums documenting the fifteen year long civil war, whereas others are there for the gourmet restaurants and chic French-style bars. The beach and promenade area is a perfect place for a relaxed walk, and the Beirut Souks Mall offers a shopping experience to rival any European city.

As Lebanon is so small, you can hop in a taxi or minibus and escape the bustle of Beirut very easily, and very cheaply. Just a couple of hours from Beirut, the eastern city of Baalbek hosts the amazing ruins of a Byzantine (Roman) settlement, with the Temple of Bacchus a largely unknown rival to the Acropolis of Athens.

Whilst you could easily spend weeks in Lebanon, Beirut is a great base for exploring the wider Middle East, since Middle East Airlines operates out of its base at the city’s airport. For £100 or less, you could be on your way from Beirut to Egypt, Jordan, or Turkey to continue your adventure.

So why wait. For those wishing to tread a path less followed, Lebanon, and the wider Middle East, is for you.

The latest resurfacing of Izzat al-Douri, former Vice President of Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s trusted deputy, has once again turned the media limelight to Ba’athism in Iraq, but make no mistakes; Ba’athism in Iraq is dead.

In a wide-ranging interview with Tunisian paper Acharaa Al-Maghrebi on Monday, al-Douri denies the presence (in Arabic) of former Iraqi army officers in the ranks of the Islamic State, denouncing any suggestion of such a fact as slander and insult to the Ba’ath Party.

This flies in the face of years of journalism and academic study focussed on the topic; It is widely acknowledged that former players in Saddam’s Ba’ath regime have contributed to the successes of the Islamic State, especially through their occupying key roles within the powerful IS Military Council. Many years of divisive rule under the Saddam-dominated Ba’ath Party had left a fractured Iraqi state vulnerable to insurgency and sectarian fighting.

Al-Douri himself has a history of shadowy involvement with the group, since the Sufi militia he commands, the Naqshbandi Army, assisted with the annexation of the Iraqi city of Mosul, and were temporarily allowed to exercise an element of control over certain neighbourhoods. Alliances such as this have been described as “a marriage of convenience”, and in this case ultimately ended in betrayal. The existence of personal links between al-Douri and the Islamic State weakens his ability to deny any-and-all cooperation between Ba’athists and the group.

During the interview with Acharaa Al-Maghrebi, al-Douri does, in part, acknowledge limited crossover between Ba’athists and the Islamic State, but he asserts that this is only a select few former officers who had embraced radical religious tendencies seven under Saddam.

The motivation behind al-Douri’s statement would seemingly lie in his responsibility to maintain some form of relevance for the Iraqi Ba’ath Party, the movement he assumed leadership of following the execution of Saddam Hussein in December 2006.

Officially banned following the invasion, the Ba’ath party has arguably all-but collapsed; prominent officials were summarily sacked from their positions, and any Ba’athists implicated in the systematic crimes of Saddam faced the prospect of arrest. De-Ba’athification became the flagship policy of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq, forcing the party underground.

In later years, the chasm that developed between the Shia dominated government of Iraq and the wider Sunni population provided some renewed support for Ba’athists, who along with IS conspired to bring down the Maliki administration. However, it was IS that capitalised on the existence of Sunni resentment, and the meteoric rise of the group left Ba’athists trailing in its’ wake. Any Ba’athists with ambition have long been aligned with the Islamic State, and have been welcomed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi for their expertise.

Al-Douri, for all his sabre-rattling, must realise that the writing is on the wall for his Ba’ath Party. The Islamic State has superseded them in support, and taken leadership of the Sunni insurgency. Al-Douri’s denials are born of the desperation to remain relevant, but ring hollow – Ba’athism is no longer a force in Iraq.